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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PROCLAIMS THAT IT WILL NEITHER FORGIVE
NOR FORGET THOSE WHO WAGE WAR
Shantel Talbot

I. INTRODUCTION
It was a warm and sunny day on the beautiful island of Cyprus. In
direct contrast to the serene surroundings, men, women, and children
frantically fled their childhood homes, in hopes of reaching safety by
going undetected by the invading Turkish troops.1 However, many did
not make it.
Witness Mrs[.] K said that on July 21, 1974, the second
day of the Turkish invasion, she and a group of villagers
from Elia were captured when, fleeing from
bombardment, they tried to reach a range of mountains.
All 12 men arrested were civilians. They were separated
from the women and shot in front of the women, under
the orders of a Turkish officer. Some of the men were
holding children, three of whom were wounded.2
Standing before the European Commission of Human Rights, one
witness after another told story after story of needless bloodshed and
various other human rights violations the Turkish troops committed
during the invasion of Cyprus from July to August 1974.3 Scores of
people last seen in the custody of these Turkish soldiers are still missing
and are presumed to be dead.4
Cyprus brought an inter-state case before the European Court of
Human Rights (the Court), and the Court handed down its principal
judgment in 2001.5 For various reasons, including a letter from the Court
advising Cyprus not to pursue a just satisfaction6 claim at that time, the
1
See Cyprus v. Turkey (Report of the Commission), App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 Eur.
H.R.
Rep.
482
and
556,
¶
112
(1976),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-142540 [hereinafter Report of the
Commission].
2
The terrible secrets of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, SUNDAY TIMES (Jan. 23, 1977),
http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/sundaytimes.html (last visited Sept 19, 2015). See also
Report of the Commission, supra note 1, at ¶ 320.
3
See Report of the Commission, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 60–75.
4
See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16 (2014), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144151#{"itemid":["001-144151"]} (¶
48).
5
See Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 99 (2001), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59454#{"itemid":["001-59454"]}
(§
VIII).
6
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto,
and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party . . . that is to say a
sum of money by way of compensation for [sustained] damage.” European Convention for the
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issue of just satisfaction was not brought before the Court with this initial
claim.7 In 2014, some four decades after the initial violation, the Court
finally ruled against Turkey in an inter-State application for just
satisfaction.8
By applying Article 419 of the European Convention on Human
Rights to an inter-State case and awarding just satisfaction in the form of
€90,000,000 punitive damages to Cyprus, the Court’s unprecedented
ruling in Cyprus v. Turkey broadens the scope of the Court’s authority
and involvement in corralling errant nations.
The Court’s judges make their intentions and hopes for the nature of
this judgment well-known through their concurring and dissenting
opinions.10 This is the first inter-State case to be brought before the Court
seeking just satisfaction, and therefore, this judgment is influential in
crystallizing a new trend in general international law of proffering
remedies in inter-State cases.11 This case is a platform from which the
Court pronounced its dedication to punishing errant member States
through pecuniary damages, regardless of how much time has passed
since the actual violations occurred.12
Turkey, as a member of the Council of Europe, is bound to follow
the Court’s judgment and to make reparations for any human rights
violations that it commits.13 However, Turkey has taken a dismissive
stance towards this judgment. 14 The consequences that accompany
dismissing a judgment and the likelihood that the Court will enforce
them vary widely. While Turkey can withstand some of this
condemnation because of its more recent political isolation, many less
isolated countries, particularly those belonging to the European Union
(E.U.), may not be able to dismiss such a ruling so easily.15
The purpose of this Comment is to outline the current ruling’s
implications for both the Court and States (countries) that choose to
violate human rights. Following the introduction of the topic in Part I,
Part II lays out a concise history of the Cyprus Island. Specifically, it
focuses on the settlement of Cyprus, examines the time period leading up
to the partition of Cyprus in 1974 from a modern point of view, reviews
the country’s political climate from the Turkish invasion to the Grand
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 41, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 5, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter Convention].
7
See Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (¶ 3).
8
Id.
9
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 41 (defining just satisfaction).
10
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23–41 (concurring and dissenting).
11
Id. at 13 (¶ 39).
12
Id. at 30–37 (¶¶ 12–19) (Albuquerque, J., concurring).
13
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 46.
14
See Alexander Christie-Miller, Its EU dream thwarted, Turkey rejects 90 million-euro
Cyprus fine, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 13, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2014/0513/Its-EU-dream-thwarted-Turkey-rejects-90-million-euro-Cyprus-fine.
15
Mark Lowen, Erdogan's 'New Turkey' drifts towards isolation, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30111043.
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Chamber’s primary inter-State judgment against Cyprus in 2001, and
examines the Court’s May 2014 ruling on Article 41. Part II also
contains a brief explanation of Turkey’s legal responsibility to comply
with the aforementioned judgments.
Part III outlines the ways in which the Court expands its powers with
this latest judgment. Furthermore, it focuses on how the Court solidifies
an international law principle to favor applying compensatory damages
to inter-State cases, and how it thus expanded the remedies available for
it to prescribe. Part III also discusses how the Court may apply this new
prescription of powers to other countries and incidents occurring in the
world today.
Finally, Part IV addresses Turkey’s reaction to the case, and whether
or not Turkey’s reaction diminishes the Court’s influence.
II. CYPRUS: A SUCCINCT MODERN HISTORY
The balance of power on the island of Cyprus bespeaks change, as it
has shifted fairly steadily since its first inhabitants, the MycenaeanArchaean Greeks, settled there in the ninth millennium BC.16 Cyprus
experienced a long list of alien powers under the rule of foreign invaders,
including the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Macedonians,
Romans, Franks, Venetians, British, and Ottoman Turks.17 Perhaps the
most significant shift occurred when the Ottoman Turkish troops
invading Cyprus in 1570, eventually annexed it, and remained in power
until 1878, when they turned the island’s administration over to the
British in exchange for protection against a possible Russian invasion.18
Despite the Turk’s annexation, at least part of the island retained its
Greek identity.19
A. Cyprus Leading Up to Partition
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots20 have a lengthy and harried past of
general disagreement that precedes World War I. 21 Britain annexed
Cyprus island in 1914, and the Turkish-Cypriots pledged their loyalty to
the British during World War I.22 The Greek-Cypriots, however, were
not as devoted to Britain as their Turkish counterparts, and the Greek16
History
of
Cyprus,
HIGH
COMM’N
REP.
CYPRUS
CANBERRA,
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/highcom/highcomcanberra.nsf/cyprus02_en/cyprus02_en?OpenDocume
nt (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Meaning a person from Cyprus.
21
30. British Cyprus (1914–1960), UNIV. CENT. ARK., http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadmproject/europerussiacentral-asia-region/british-cyprus-1914-1960/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015)
[hereinafter British Cyprus].
22
Id.
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Cypriots formed an assembly in 1921 to demand enosis (unification with
Greece).23 However, Britain declared Cyprus to be a British colony in
1925 and in 1929 the British Colonial Secretary officially denied the
Greek-Cypriots’ demands for unification with Greece in 1929.24
After the Greek-Cypriots’ attempts, the Turkish-Cypriots, with
objections of their own, tried to form their own National Congress in
1931. 25 Predictably, the British Colonial Government refused to
recognize the Congress. 26 That same year, the Legislative Council’s
Greek-Cypriot members resigned from their positions in protest after the
British Colonial Government passed a tariff law. 27 The tariff law
fomented yet another round of riots and unrest from the Greek-Cypriots,
which the British again suppressed.28
In 1950, a plebiscite was held, where ninety-six percent of the
Greek-Cypriot population voted in favor of unification with Greece.29 In
response, the British Colonial Government banned all protests and
demonstrations. 30 Consequently, Greece brought the Cyprus matter
before the United Nations (UN); however, the UN General Assembly
replied that it was not “deemed advisable to make a decision on the
question of Cyprus.”31
In 1955, the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters),
who was not only anti-Britain, but also pro-unification with Greece, and
is now known as a terrorist group, revolted against the British.32 The
EOKA revolt ultimately culminated in the deportation of a leading
advocate of enosis, the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios, for
“actively fostering terrorism” and for supporting the creation of EOKA.33
In 1960, after a four-year struggle between both Greek- and TurkishCypriots vying for power, Cyprus was finally granted its independence.34
Shortly after returning to Cyprus on March 1, 1959, Archbishop
Makarios was elected President.35 He, along with Turkish-Cypriot Vice
President Fazıl Küçük, attempted to form the government of the newly
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. See also 1956: Britain deports Cyprus Archbishop, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/9/newsid_3745000/3745505.stm (last visited
Sept 19, 2015).
32
British Cyprus, supra note 21. See also 1956: Britain deports Cyprus Archbishop, supra
note 31.
33
Id.
34
Modern
History
of
Cyprus.
EMBASSY
REP.
CYPRUS
WASH.
D.C.,
http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=8 (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
35
British Cyprus, supra note 21. See also Markarios elected president of Cyprus, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/14/newsid_3747000/3747247.stm
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2015).
24
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established country.36 The new Cypriot constitution mandated quotas of
Turkish representatives in government.37 However, according to GreekCypriots, the Turkish quotas exceeded the percentage of the Turkish
population. 38 It was not long before Makarios proposed abolishing
several passages of the constitution written to guarantee the rights and
interests of Turkish-Cypriots, demonstrating the extensive differences
that still existed between the two groups.39 As a result, the TurkishCypriots rebelled and refused to report to their public service positions or
attend to their seats in the Cabinet, and violence erupted between the two
co-inhabitants of the island.40 An autonomous Cyprus, as an independent
state that protected the rights of both its Greek and Turkish citizens,
seemed to be a failed experiment.
B. Cyprus v. Turkey: 1974 to the Primary Ruling
In 1974, a coup, backed by the military junta in Athens, Greece,
ousted Makarios based on concerns that he was “influenced by
communism and [was] unwilling to commit to continued close ties with
Athens.”41 Turkey deployed troops in response to this takeover under the
premise of helping Turkish-Cypriots that were in “desperate need of
protection,” and then took possession of thirty-seven percent of the
northern part of the island. 42 As a result, nearly all Greek-Cypriots
(almost 200,000 people, or forty percent of the total Greek-Cypriot
population) fled from that portion of Cyprus; and nearly all the TurkishCypriots moved to the Turkish controlled territory.43 According to a
conservative estimate, ninety percent of the Greek-Cypriots formerly
living in the occupied area fled south or to British sovereign bases.44
Some 13,000 Greek-Cypriot farmers remained in the remote Karpas
peninsula located in the Turkish military zone.45 That number is said to
have decreased over the years to less than 600 individuals.46
Upon the eviction of the Greek-Cypriots and through the aid of
Turkish national troops, a new government was established: the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).47 Turkey continues to control this

36
Paul Rowan & Stephen Armstrong, Cyprus and the European Union, PROGRAMS INT’L
EDUC. RESOURCES, http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/pier/resources/lessons/cyprus_history.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2015).
37
ANDREW BOROWIEC, CYPRUS: A TROUBLED ISLAND 47 (2000).
38
Id.
39
Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36.
40
Id. See also Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34.
41
Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36.
42
Id.
43
Id. See also Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34.
44
See BOROWIEC, supra note 37, at 97.
45
Id. at 98.
46
Id.
47
Rowan & Armstrong, supra note 36.
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portion of the island48 and is the only country to recognize the TRNC
government.49 In fact, the UN Security Council and other international
bodies condemned the TRNC government.50 Because the government of
TRNC has not been recognized, the Court, in its 2001 judgment, held
Turkey responsible for the various human rights violations that were
committed, stating, “Having effective overall control over northern
Cyprus, [Turkey’s] responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its
own soldiers or officials . . . [b]ut must also be engaged by virtue of the
acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish
military and other support.”51
In 2001, Turkey was found to have committed fourteen violations of
the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention). 52 Most
notably, the Court found that there had been a “continuing violation of
Article 2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent
State to conduct an effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate
of Greek-Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening
circumstances.”53 The Court also found violations of Article 3 in relation
to the Karpas peninsula’s enclaved Greek-Cypriots for condemning the
inhabitants to live in conditions that were “debasing and [that] violate the
very notion of respect for the human dignity of its members.”54 However,
the Court unanimously held that it was not yet ready to make a decision
about the “issue of the possible application of Article 41” at the time, so
it “adjourned consideration” on the topic.55
C. Cyprus v. Turkey: Just Satisfaction
In 2010, nine years after the principal judgment, Cyprus submitted
its claims for just satisfaction.56 The Court heard the application and
passed a judgment in May 2014.57 Turkey raised three main arguments
against applying just satisfaction in this case.58 First, Turkey claimed that
too much time had passed since the principal judgment, and that Cyprus
had had a duty, under international law, to bring the case as soon as

48
The Council of Europe and the Cyprus Question, EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS IN
WASHINGTON
D.C.
(last
visited
Sept
19,
2015)
http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=18.
49
Modern History of Cyprus, supra note 34.
50
Id.
51
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 18 (1995), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920#{"itemid":["001-57920"]} (¶ 62).
See also Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20–21 (¶ 77).
52
See Cyprus v. Turkey (Principal Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
53
Id. at 36 (¶ 136).
54
Id. at 74 (¶ 309).
55
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (¶ 4).
56
Id. (¶ 6).
57
See id.
58
See id.
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possible. 59 Second, Turkey asserted that the Court should not apply
Article 41 to inter-State cases because just satisfaction should only be
applied to individuals. 60 Lastly, Turkey argued that the Court had
discretion in dispensing judgments and that the initial judgment thirteen
years earlier was punishment enough.61
Addressing the first point, Turkey argued that this latest filing should
not be permitted because it would be time-barred to individual
applicants, and the thirteen-year gap between the judgment on the merits
and this renewed application was far too long.62 The Court held that
while the rules for a timely filing for just satisfaction had since changed
and would have precluded Cyprus from filing,63 the changes did not
apply in this particular case because of the special circumstances
surrounding it.64 Namely, the Court advised Cyprus, in a letter sent to
both governments, not to apply for just satisfaction in 2001 when the
Court was deciding the case on the merits.65 In addition, the Court’s
initial judgment set aside claims for just satisfaction, and did not
preclude Cyprus from ever coming before the Court again.66 The Court
also noted that Cyprus did not expressly say it would never apply for just
satisfaction, so there was no reason for Turkey to believe that Cyprus
would not.67
As to the second point, the Cypriot government initially asked for
€12,000 to be allocated to each of the surviving relatives of each of the
1,456 missing persons, but later raised the amount to €20,000 per
individual.68 It also asked for €50,000 for each Greek-Cypriot resident of
the Karpas peninsula.69 The fact that Cyprus did not attempt to identify
the number of potential beneficiaries Turkey claimed from the Karpas
peninsula70 did not seem to sway the Court from offering reparations.
This was one of Turkish Judge Karakaᶊ’ strongest complaints in his
dissenting opinion, especially since the Court belabored the idea that just
satisfaction was pertinent to inter-State cases only because the money
was to be given to the individuals and not to the State; yet, these
individuals were not identified.71

59

Id. at 5–6 (¶¶ 18–19).
Id. at 13 (¶ 38).
61
Id. at 18 (¶ 55).
62
Id. at 5–7 (¶¶ 18, 22).
63
See id. at 8 (¶ 25).
64
Id. at 8–9 (¶ 26). (“In the principal judgment the issue of a possible award of just satisfaction
was adjourned, which clearly and unambiguously meant that the Court had not excluded the
possibility of resuming the examination of this issue at some appropriate point in the future. Neither
of the parties could therefore reasonably expect that this matter would be left unaddressed, or that it
would be extinguished or nullified by the passage of time.”).
65
Id. at 2 (¶ 3).
66
Id. at 8–9 (¶ 26).
67
Id. at 5 (¶ 15).
68
Id. at 16 (¶ 49).
69
Id. at 17 (¶ 53).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 55 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting).
60
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Along with the UN Committee of Missing Persons, Turkey argued
that it had progressed since the initial judgment and many of the missing
persons had been found, thereby turning the “missing persons” issue into
a “dead persons” issue, bringing to light a whole new set of procedural
obligations and time limits.72 Although Turkey argued that the Court had
acknowledged their “considerable progress in locating and identifying
the victims’ remains,”73 various third parties seem to disagree. Several
non-profits have written to the Committee of Ministers (the body
overseeing Turkey’s compliance with the principal judgment) to
complain about Turkey’s lack of compliance with former judgments and
to advocate for the Committee of Ministers to do more to force Turkey
into compliance.74
Finally, as to the last point, Turkey argued that the Court had
discretion in offering punitive damages, and in light of the improvements
to living conditions in Karpas made in the years since the initial
judgment, the Court should have “decide[d] that the finding of a
violation in the judgment on the merits offers a sufficient satisfaction.”75
The dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaᶊ discusses the reasoning behind
this argument by referencing the Corfu Channel case where, “by reason
of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters in the course of the
Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom
violated the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of Albania, and that
this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate
72

Id. at 6–7 (¶ 21).
Id. See also Charalambous and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110459#{"itemid":["001-110459"]}.
74
See Letter from Organisation of Relatives of Missing Cypriots (UK) to Director General,
Directorate General for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Secretariat of the Council of Europe
(Nov.
12,
2013),
available
at
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIma
ge=2415508&SecMode=1&DocId=2090616&Usage=2 (“It is only with Turkey’s co-operation that
our problem will finally be resolved. We feel extremely aggrieved that successive Turkish
Governments have never shown the goodwill necessary to provide the solution to this long standing
humanitarian issue. . . . The case of our Missing is the longest standing unresolved issue before the
ECHR and the Committee, and how it is managed and resolved will set a precedent for current and
future cases. The upholding of justice and human rights rest on the shoulders of these institutions.”).
See Letter from Ashia Community Council to Mr. Philippe Boillat, Director General of Human
Rights and the Rule of Law, Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECHR, Council of
Europe
(Nov.
29,
2013),
available
at
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetI
mage=2415496&SecMode=1&DocId=2090582&Usage=2 (complaining that the sites of mass
graves that the CMP were given to examine and identify the missing had previously been excavated
with evidence that “[t]he exhumation and disappearance of the remains of these individuals clearly
intended to erase the evidence of a war crime;” the Council called for the investigation into what
happened to these people to continue). See Letter from Organisation of relatives of undeclared
prisoners and missing persons of Cyprus to Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers, available at
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIma
ge=2242750&SecMode=1&DocId=1988110&Usage=2 (requesting that that Committee pressure
Turkey into allowing them to dig up their father’s remains which are a short distance from where a
piece of his skull had been allegedly moved into a mass grave to halt the investigations).
75
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 (¶¶ 54–55).
73
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satisfaction.”76 Judge Karakaᶊ went on to cite two other cases, one as
recent as 2000, each of which similarly concluded that the Court has
discretion to decide if the just satisfaction is sufficient.77
However, the Court clearly did not find this argument persuasive.
Whether or not the Court took Turkey’s supposed progress and past
judgments into account during its just compensation analysis is
unknown. Regardless of the weight given to past judgments, the Court
reiterated its general statement in the Varnava v. Others judgment,
saying, “non-pecuniary awards serve to give recognition to the fact that
moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human
right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage.”78
Ultimately, the Court awarded the Cypriot Government “aggregate
sums of €30,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
surviving relatives of the missing persons, and €60,000,000 for nonpecuniary damage suffered by the enclaved residents of Karpas
peninsula.”79 The Cypriot Government was given the task of divvying
the reward to the individuals the judgment recognized.80
Following a judgment, it is every Member State’s responsibility to
comply with judgments by making restitution, usually in the form of
legislation reform, to ensure that the human rights violation will not
continue.81 The Court may also grant just satisfaction in the form of
monetary compensation if the applicant State has received damage.82 It is
then the Committee of Minister’s responsibility to see that the sum is
collected.83
D. The Duty of Restitution/Reparation in Human Rights Cases
Perhaps the most pertinent article in the Convention to the current
judgment is Article 46, which reads, “[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to
which they are parties.”84 This agreement portrays the demand that each
State comply with all judgments laid against them. Turkey, and every
other Contracting Party to the Convention, has thus implicitly agreed to
obey the edicts of the Court. In the words of the Court:
Under Article 46, the State Party is under an obligation
not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by the
Court by way of just satisfaction, but also to take
76

Id. at 53 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting).
Id. at 53–54 (Karakaᶊ, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 18 (¶ 56).
79
Id. at 19 (¶ 58).
80
Id. at 21 (¶ 5(c)).
81
The ECHR in 50 Questions,
EUR. CT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (¶ 41).
82
Id.
83
Id. (¶ 42).
84
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (¶ 11).
77
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individual or, if appropriate, general measures in its
domestic legal order, or both, to put an end to the
violation found by the Court and to redress the effects,
the aim being to put the applicant, as far as possible, in
the position he would have been in had the requirements
of the Convention not been disregarded.85
As the Court noted, it is widely accepted under international law that
States have an obligation to not only cease and desist from performing
whatever wrongful act they are committing, 86 but also to offer
reparations as a remedy for the wrong that was done.87 In 2001, the
International Law Commission codified these norms in the Articles of
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles of
Responsibility).88 Article 30 of the Articles of Responsibility affirms that
the State that perpetrated the wrongdoing has an obligation “(a) to cease
that act, if it is continuing;” and “(b) to offer appropriate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.” 89 This
obligation exists separately from the obligation to make reparations as
declared in Article 31, which states, “The responsible State is under an
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act.”90
This idea of being obligated to pay reparations predates the Articles
of Responsibility and goes as far back as the Factory of Chorzów case
brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in
1927. 91 “The PCIJ added that reparation ‘is the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no need for
this to be stated in the convention itself.’”92 Subsequently, various courts,
including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have acknowledged the
concept. 93 Likewise, the Court in the present just satisfaction case
followed this reasoning when responding to Turkey’s argument that the
initial ruling on the merits was enough punishment.

85

Id. at 9–10 (¶ 27).
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR,
56th
Sess.,
Supp.
No.
10,
U.N.
Doc.
A/56/10
(2001),
available
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf (Article 30: “The
State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it
is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances
so require.”).
87
Antoine Buyse, Lost and Regained? Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights Violations in
the Context of International Law, 68 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (2008).
88
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 86
(art. 30).
89
Id. (art. 30).
90
Id. (art. 31).
91
Buyse, supra note 87, at 130.
92
Id.
93
Id.
86
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Having received the judgment in 2001, Turkey would be responsible
for making reparations based on general international law alone.
However, it is subject to an even stronger compulsion. Turkey ratified
the Convention in 1954 and subsequently accepted the right to apply to
the Court individually in 1987.94 Just three short years later, Turkey
chose to accept the decisions of the Court and pay any potential fines
imposed on it in judgments.95 In 1993, Turkey brought its first individual
application before the Court, and the Court made its first decisions on
Turkey in 1995. 96 Therefore, Turkey is not only subject to general
international law, but also to the rules laid out in the Convention.
The Convention 97 has several articles that pertain to remedies. 98
However, the Court’s ability to order restitution comes from Article 41.99
“The Court analogizes Article 41 of the Convention to the principle of
reparations in public international law.100 The Court also proclaims that
the power of an international court or tribunal “which has jurisdiction
with the respect to a claim of State responsibility,” and “has, as an aspect
of that jurisdiction, the power to award compensation for damage
suffered.”101
After declaring such an order, Article 46 of the Convention instructs
that, “[t]he final judgment of the Court shall [then] be transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.” 102
Therefore, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is in
charge of supervising the Grand Chamber of the Court’s finalized
execution of judgments.103
III. THE EXPANDING POWERS OF THE COURT
The analysis laid out in the concurring opinions accompanying the
judgment makes it clear that the Court is using the just satisfaction
judgment as a launching board to afford itself more power in levying
punitive punishments against noncompliant Contracting Parties. One
concurring opinion, in which multiple judges agreed with, declared this
judgment as heralding “a new era in the enforcement of human rights
upheld by the Court and mark[ing] an important step in ensuring respect
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JITEM’s illegal actions cost Turkey a fortune, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Aug. 27, 2008, 8:36 PM),
http://www.todayszaman.com/national_jitems-illegal-actions-cost-turkey-a-fortune_151355.html.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 41.
98
See generally id. at arts. 13, 41. (for example, Article 13 provides for an “effective remedy
before a national authority”).
99
Convention, supra note 6.
100
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13–14 (¶ 41).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 3 (¶ 11).
103
Supervision of execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL
EUR., http://www.coe.int/T/CM/humanRights_en.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
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for the rule of law in Europe.”104 Another concurring opinion indicated
this was
the most important contribution to peace in Europe in
the history of the European Court of Human Rights . . . .
The Court has not only acknowledged the applicability
of Article 41 of the European Convention on Human
Rights . . . to inter-State applications and established
criteria for the assessment of the time-limit for these just
satisfaction claims, but has awarded punitive damages to
the claimant State.105
In light of the “historical importance of this judgment,”106 this Part
will expound upon (a) the importance of establishing customary law in
inter-State cases and in the application of punitive damages; (b) the
application of a Court-created time limit for the payment of the claims;
and (c) possible applications of this newfound power.
A. Establishing Customary Law in Favor of Inter-State Cases
The Convention distinguishes between two types of applications that
can be brought before the Court: “individual applications lodged by any
person, group of individuals, company or NGO having a complaint about
a violation of their rights, and inter-State applications brought by one
State against another.”107 Individuals present most applications brought
before the Court.108 In fact, Greek-Cypriots brought several individual
cases against Turkey pertaining to the same set of facts.109 Although
inter-State cases are rare,110 the current judgment for just satisfaction
hails from an inter-State application.
Article 33 of the Convention allows the Court to hear inter-State
cases.111 It reads: “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols
thereto by another High Contracting Party.” 112 This is a very broad
standard. Despite Turkey’s continual assertions to the contrary, Cyprus,
or any other State for that matter, can refer even an alleged breach of the
Convention to the Court. A State may hold another State responsible for
104
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (Zupančič, Gyulumyan,
Björgvinsson, Nicolaou, Sajó, Trajkovska, Power-Forde, Vučinić and Albuquerque, J., joint
concurring).
105
Id. at 24 (Albuquerque, J., concurring).
106
Id.
107
The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 81, at 6 (¶ 19).
108
Id.
109
See Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.
110
The ECHR in 50 Questions, supra note 81, at 6 (¶ 19).
111
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 33.
112
Id.
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any violation of the Convention, including military regime violations, as
was demonstrated in the case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the
Netherlands v. Greece in 1967–68.113
While inter-State cases have come before the Court in the past, this is
the first instance where the Court used the just satisfaction judgment to
levy punishment. However, the Cypriot Government argued that the
Court previously implied that Article 41 applied to inter-State cases by
mentioning in a previous case that it was “not necessary to apply it,”
rather than dismissing the potential Article 41 judgment.114
In response, Turkey referred to Varnava and Others v. Turkey,
where the Court used just satisfaction to allow individual applicants to
bring separate claims, despite the fact that an inter-State case was already
judged upon the same set of facts; this reasoning took precedence over
general international law. 115 In this 2009 Varnava and Others case,
Turkey objected to the individual applications because the inter-State
application had already had a judgment made and used the same set of
facts.116 However, the Court replied that the judgment “did not specify in
respect [to] which individual missing persons [the judgments] were made
(see Cyprus v. Turkey, . . . where the evidence was found to bear out the
assertion that ‘many persons now missing’ had been detained by the
respondent Government or forces for which they were responsible).”117
Therefore, the judgment cannot be regarded as determinative in the
individuals’ applications. Additionally, the Court determined that it had
“the competence to issue just satisfaction awards for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage suffered by individual applicants and to give
indications under Article 46 as to any general or individual measures that
might be taken.” 118 Therefore, the individual applicants’ applications
could result in different issues or outcomes than those that arose in the
inter-State case, and the Court could examine those applicants’
applications.119
While the Court did not expressly say that just satisfaction could
only be brought in individual cases, Turkey’s interpretation of the
Court’s decision seemed sound. The Court listed ways that the individual
applications differed from the already decided State application and
113
Isabella Risini, Can’t get no just satisfaction? The Cyprus v. Turkey judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (May 23, 2014),
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/05/23/cant-get-just-satisfaction-cyprus-v-turkey-judgment-european-courthuman-rights/.
114
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11 (2014), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-144151#{"itemid":["001-144151"]} (¶
33), arguing that in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57506#{"itemid":["001-57506"]},
the
Court asked the applicant if it would like the Court to consider just satisfaction, but Ireland declined
the invitation.
115
Cyprus v. Turkey, (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶ 23).
116
Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eut. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 118–19.
117
Id.
118
Id. (emphasis added).
119
Id. ¶ 119.
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expressly noted that individual applicants could bring just satisfaction
claims.120
The Court countered Turkey’s argument by asserting, “the provisions
of the Convention cannot be applied and interpreted in a vacuum.”121 The
Court went on to say, “Despite its specific character as a human rights
instrument, the Convention is an international treaty to be interpreted in
accordance with the relevant norms and principles of public international
law.”122
The Court also noted that Article 41 is lex specialis to general
international law,123 but still chose a broad interpretation of Article 41
that mirrors that of general international law. The Court explained that
while Article 41 would be allowed in inter-State cases, the conveyance of
an award by the Court would be decided on a case-by-case basis
depending on the type of complaint offered.124 Also, the award would
only be granted if the actual victims of the harm and recipients of the
award were individuals themselves.125 The Court stated:
[I]t must be always kept in mind that, according to the
very nature of the Convention, it is the individual, and
not the State, who is directly or indirectly harmed and
primarily “injured” by a violation of one or several
Convention rights. Therefore, if just satisfaction is
afforded in an inter-State case, it should always be done
for the benefit of individual victims.126
This means that general complaints brought under Article 33 about
systemic issues or administrative practices will not warrant compensation
under Article 41, as the main goal of those cases is that of “vindicating
the public order of Europe within the framework of collective
responsibility under the Convention.”127
According to the dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaᶊ and the partly
concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Casadevall, this is
contradictory. Using vivid language, Judge Karakaᶊ argued:
According to the principles of public international law
on reparation for non-pecuniary damage in cases not
concerning diplomatic protection, the violation found in
the judgment on the merits should constitute sufficient
120

See Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Eut. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 119.
Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (¶ 23).
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just satisfaction, without it being necessary to award
aggregate, not to say speculative, sums such as those
claimed by the Cypriot Government in respect of “nonpecuniary damage” on behalf of a vague and
unidentifiable number of persons purported to be still
alive.128
Judge Karakas argued that this case was not one with identifiable
individuals that the Court described in its judgment.129 Judge Casadevall
agrees with this sentiment in part. He voted in favor of awarding just
satisfaction to the identified 1,456 missing persons, but rejected applying
just satisfaction to the residents of the Karpas peninsula “who [were]
defined in an abstract manner . . . [as] individuals who ha[d] to be
identified and listed ex post facto eleven years after the delivery of the
judgment on the merits.”130 He went on to say:
If numerous difficulties are likely to be encountered in
providing compensation (within eighteen months) to the
heirs of the 1,456 missing persons, I dread to think of the
complications that are bound to arise in identifying and
listing the thousands of displaced persons. Supervising
the execution of this judgment will be no easy task.131
In his concurring opinion, Judge Albuquerque acknowledged that
there was no certainty that the payments will reach the actual victims in
the Karpas peninsula, and he uses that fact, among others, to illustrate
that the “punitive nature of this compensation is flagrant.”132
Judge Albuquerque put into plain terms his view of the award given
to Cyprus.133 He heralded the fact that punitive damages are a tool for
upholding human rights and ensuring the “observance of the
engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties.”134 He maintained
that the use of punitive damages was especially prudent in this case
because Turkey committed a myriad of human rights violations “over a
significant period of time in Northern Cyprus,”135 did not investigate
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Id. at 53 (Krakaᶊ, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Id. at 46 (Casadevall, J., partly concurring and partly dissenting).
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Id.
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Id. at 31 (¶ 13) (Albuquerque, J., concurring).
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these violations “adequately and in a timely manner,” 136 and
“deliberately failed year after year to comply with the Grand Chamber’s
judgment on the merits delivered a long time ago with regard to these
specific violations.”137
The door to awarding just satisfaction in inter-State applications has
been opened, and, read in conjunction with the concurring opinions, it
appears that just satisfaction has been used as a means to punish Turkey
for its lack of compliance with the Convention and past judgments. In
spite of Turkey’s objections, just satisfaction can now be applied even
though the harmed individuals have not been expressly identified.
B. Possible Applications of this Newfound Power
In light of the €90,000,000 judgment meted out, and of the
explanations for that judgment laid out in Judge Albuquerque’s
concurring opinion, one can easily see that the Court hoped to use the
punitive nature of the award to keep errant nations that violate human
rights from becoming complacent with paying money alone as
compensation for their actions. This Part gives an example of how just
satisfaction may have a bearing on the recent occupations carried out by
Russia.
The Court’s ruling came at an inconvenient time for the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots who had just resumed peace talks after a two-year
hiatus.138 One must assume that the Court had a very good reason for
potentially undermining an attempt at peace. It did not escape anyone’s
attention that this forthright ruling immediately followed Crimea’s
amalgamation into Russia. Based on the pointed remarks of the
concurring opinions, it is highly likely that the Court plans on taking a
more active role in policing any European aggressor.
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque severely admonished in his concurring
opinion:
The message to member States of the Council of Europe
is clear: those member States that wage war, invade or
support foreign armed intervention in other member
States must pay for their unlawful actions and the
consequences of their actions, and the victims, their
families and the States of their nationality have a vested
and enforceable right to be duly and fully compensated
by the responsible warring State. War and its tragic
consequences are no longer tolerable in Europe and
those member States that do not comply with this
136
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principle must be made judicially accountable for their
actions, without prejudice to additional political
consequences.139
While this is an aggressive statement toward any warmongering
State, it came just months after Ukraine filed an application against
Russia before the European Court of Human Rights.140 The timing of this
decision did not go unnoticed; one cannot help but wonder if this
judgment came in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea that took
place just two months prior to the pronouncement of this judgment.141
Was this judgment a direct response to current events? The question
of jurisdiction was an existing obstacle for holding States that practiced
armed intervention responsible before the European Court of Human
Rights for their intrusion and subsequent human rights violation. The
Russia-Crimea fact pattern somewhat mirrors that of the Turkey-Cyprus
situation. Turkey invaded Cyprus and took hold of thirty-seven percent
of the island to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots there.142
Although a separate government (the TRNC) was established, it was not
recognized by any other State; thus, in the eyes of international law,
Cyprus has only one government. 143 Through the laws of secession,
Russia claimed that Crimea was an independent state and that Russian
citizens needed Russia to help protect their interests.144 Like Turkey’s
sole recognition of the TRNC, Russia was the only State to recognize
Crimea as an independent State before absorbing it.145 Since Crimea’s
secession was not recognized by any other State, its absorption into
Russia was achieved by a use of force, and therefore, no other State
recognized the change in territory to Ukraine. 146 Some British legal
scholars summarized this position succinctly:
A state in occupation of the territory of another state,
even following a lawful armed conflict, has no right to
annex that territory. Therefore, even if, hypothetically,
one were to entertain the multiple justifications put
139
Cyprus v. Turkey, (Just Satisfaction), Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20 (¶ 1) (Albuquerque, J.,
concurring).
140
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forward by Russia as to why the intervention into
Ukraine might have been lawful, the international
community would still be obliged not to recognize the
changes to the territorial boundaries of Ukraine.147
If the international community has not recognized Crimea as being
under Russian jurisdiction, how will the Court hold Russia responsible
for human rights violations taking place in what it perceives as the
territory of Ukraine? The principal judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey held
Turkey liable for human rights violations taking place in Northern
Cyprus without acknowledging that it actually annexed Northern Cyprus.
Thus, that judgment could be applied in this situation where Russia has
forcefully annexed Crimea.148 A senior research fellow writing for the
European Journal of International Law alleges:
This holding indeed is significant to Ukraine, as it makes
clear that non-recognition is not inconsistent with
applying the rules and procedures of the Convention
against the State which purports to have effected the
change of boundaries by force. Applied to Crimea, the
Russian Federation is answerable under the Convention
for its conduct in that territory, and to hold Russia
answerable does nothing to qualify or erode the general
non-recognition of the unlawful annexation.149
Regardless of whether the international community recognizes the
territory shift, the Cyprus judgment allows for the punishment of warring
States. It may be too soon to identify the exact violations of the
Convention that have been committed by Russia during its invasion of
Crimea. However, the initial indications are distressing, as demonstrated
by the fact that the Court has already issued interim measures to Russia
in relation to Articles 2 and 3, under Rule 39.150
Clearly the passage of time—forty years—from the initial situation
in Cyprus that gave rise to the claims did not serve to deter the Court
from deciding the Cyprus just satisfaction claim. Philippe Sands, a law
professor from the University College London said in an interview with
The Guardian, “It’s a strong signal that the passage of time will not
diminish the consequences or costs of illegal occupation.”151 This begs
the question: Is Russia, or any other country that performs armed
147
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intervention in another State, opening itself up to just satisfaction claims
indefinitely? Judge Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion, alluded to
the fact that they just might, when he observed that “international law in
general did not at that time, and still does not today, set a specific timelimit for just satisfaction claims.”152 It appears that the just satisfaction
ruling is the Court’s way of showing that the passage of time (more than
forty years in this case) does not preclude the Court from meting out
harsh remedies.
The Court’s forceful statement was clear, at least in theory. But, has
the Court overstepped its bounds? Will it be taken seriously? Can it be
trusted to be a neutral intermediary between States? Some believe that
the aggressive stance taken by the Court, namely openly stating that the
just satisfaction award is a punishment, will likely not achieve the goal of
correcting Turkey’s unsatisfactory behavior and may even be
counterproductive.153
Isabella Risini, in an article posted in the Cambridge Journal of
International and Comparative Law, cautioned the Court to remember
that “the success of the Convention, is, as it was sixty years ago,
inherently depended on the cooperation of states.” She goes on to say,
The objectivity and neutrality of the Court will be
essential if it wants to be taken seriously as an arbiter in
cases such as the one between Russia and Ukraine,
especially when it asks for respect for interim
measures in inter-state proceedings without being able to
rely on a clear legal foundation.154
The Court may continue to exact harsh punishments that create
precedent for future cases, but if the Contracting Parties do not cooperate
with the Court, the Court may lose its credibility.
The Court has had much greater success in getting nations that
violate the Convention to pay fines than in getting them to enact
legislation to fix the problem.155 This is certainly the case, as Cyprus has
complained, in the case of missing persons.156 In an article published by
the Chatham House, various legal scholars note:
The ECHR is experienced in dealing with cases of
forced disappearances. However, it may be said that the
court has yet to show progress in ordering a state to
carry out effective investigations which would offer, in
part, redress to victims. The dissenting and concurring
152
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opinions in Medova v. Russia and Varnava v. Turkey
raise this point.157
It is the Court’s job to make decisions on the merits of a case, but it
has always been the Committee of Minister’s job to monitor “the
execution of judgments, particularly to ensure payment of the amounts
awarded by the Court to the applicants in compensation for the damage
they have sustained.”158 The Court seems to be taking a more active role
in deciding how they want the case to be taken care of. The Court
demonstrated its activism by issuing a timeline (three months) for Turkey
to make the payments to Cyprus.159 Some judges showed concern about
the Court’s apparent overstepping of its role. 160 Cyprus asked for a
declaratory judgment to be made against Turkey for Turkey’s lack of
response to the initial judgment.161 The Court granted the declaratory
judgment but rightfully responded that it was the Committee of
Minister’s job to “ensure that this holding which is binding in accordance
with the Convention, and which has not yet been complied with, is given
full effect by the respondent Government.”162
The Court, however, did not stop there. Joined by Judge Krakaᶊ, four
judges concurred in part in the judgment claiming that the final sentence
of Paragraph 63163 made by the Court “extend[s] the powers of the Court
and runs counter to Article 46 § 2 of the Convention by encroaching on
the powers of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to
which the Convention has entrusted the task of supervising execution of
the Court’s judgments.”164
The four judges said that the “Court does not have jurisdiction to
verify whether a Contracting Party has complied with the obligations
imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments.”165 By allowing Cyprus
to circumvent the Committee of Ministers and refer a matter to the Court,
the Court has potentially created an “imbalance in the distribution of
powers between the two institutions that was envisaged by the authors of
the Convention.”166
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Albuquerque hailed the Court’s
right to make this declaratory judgment despite the fact that the
application was decided in 2001 and the foreseeing of the execution of
the judgment passed to the Committee of Ministers.167 He particularly
relied on Article 41.168 He then distinguished the difference between the
duty that a Member State has to prevent and abstain from violations of
the Convention, and the fine of compensation that is put forth as a
remedy.169 He maintained:
Were it otherwise, the European human rights protection
system would be flawed, because States could commit
violations with impunity so long as they provided
compensation to the victims of the violations after
having committed unlawful acts. As the Commission
stated in a number of cases, “the State [cannot] escape
from its obligations merely by paying compensation.”170
Assuming that the Court did infringe on the Committee of Minister’s
duties by granting a declaration, and that the awarding of just satisfaction
claims is a punitive weapon that the Court plans to arm itself with for
future use, what are the implications? One could argue that the ultimate
goal of the Convention is to keep Contracting Parties from committing
human rights violations and then to give those who have been victimized
a course of redress. In a situation where the Court finds that a violation
of the Convention has taken place, the pressure (as stated in Article 30 of
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (2001))171 is for cessation of the act causing the harm and
for assurance that legislation will be enacted so it will not happen again.
The Court is unlikely to forgive Member States who have not
enacted the general measures necessary to rectify the violations
committed and to prevent such violations from recurring. Furthermore,
the Court will not forget those Member States who choose not to comply,
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as just satisfaction claims are not time-barred and the Court has a long
memory.
IV. TURKEY’S RESPONSE TO THE JUDGMENT
Turkey is likely reeling from this groundbreaking decision. Turkey’s
response to the judgment has the potential to profoundly impact its
foreign relations with respect to its newly resumed peace talks with
Cyprus and to its application to join the European Union. Because of this
largely unresolved conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots,
representatives of both factions are intermittently involved in
negotiations to reach an amicable solution.172 The attitude that Turkey
adopts towards the just satisfaction judgment will strongly affect how its
efforts at meeting a resolution are perceived. Turkey is also currently
expressing interest in joining the European Union. Turkey’s behavior
toward its responsibility and commitment to its current membership in
the European Court of Human Rights rulings can have a large impact on
whether the European Union perceives Turkey as a suitable candidate.173
The outstanding question, however, is whether or not Turkey’s response
to the judgment diminishes the impact that the Court was trying to create.
A. Turkey’s Intent to Ignore the Ruling
Where Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a
legitimate governmental entity and instead it recognizes the TRNC as the
legitimate government, Turkey has argued throughout all cases brought
by Cyprus before the European Court of Human Rights in relation to this
incident that Cyprus does not have standing to refer claims to the
Court.174
Following the judgment, various news agencies quoted the Turkish
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu as saying, “In terms of the grounds
of this ruling, its methods and the fact that it is considering a country that
Turkey does not recognise as a counterpart, we don’t see it as binding
and we see no need to make the payment.”175 Davutoglu went on to argue
that not only had the Court exceeded its authority, but also that the
timing of the decision was “meaningful” and “unfortunate.” 176 The
Turkish and Cypriot governments had just commenced much anticipated
172
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negotiations about how to peacefully settle this long-standing conflict
and now Turkey fears that this will give the Cypriot government undue
leverage in the negotiations that may bring to a halt any progress that
may have been made.177
Turkey’s blatant denial of any need to pay the just satisfaction seems
rather daring. Turkey has paid damages in the past,178 but has a history of
only partial compliance with judgments coming from the Court. 179
However, it would be surprising for Turkey to fully dismiss the ruling, as
States rarely completely ignore a ruling but can be prone to partial
compliance.180
B. Potential Consequences of not Following the Ruling
While some would argue that there are no realistic consequences for
not complying with the judgments handed down by the Grand Chamber
(as there has been an epidemic of States only partially complying with
judgments),181 the Court gave Turkey a time limit of three months to pay
Cyprus the €90,000,000.182 If Turkey did not pay, it would be charged
interest.183 Upon further insubordination “legal experts said the country
could theoretically have non-sovereign, commercial assets abroad seized
to pay the damages.”184 When discussing the ramifications for Turkey’s
refusal to abide by the ruling, reporter Ceren Mutus Toprakseven of the
Turkish Weekly, reported:
[T]here is now an ECHR decision which is undisputedly
binding on Turkey under international law . . . . If
Turkey resists paying the compensation within the three
months allotted, interest will be added to the amount at
first. Further rejection of payment may result in the
Committee of Ministers’ placement of consistent
pressure on Turkey through the adoption of interim
resolutions (Rule 16) like in the case of Loizidou v.
Turkey, and it may even lead to the application of Article
8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, which
envisages the suspension of the right of representation
and exclusion from the Council of Europe. Although in
177
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reality, the second measure has never been used, the
Committee of Ministers officially brandished the threat
of exclusion for the first time in Loizidou case.
Obviously, it would not be desirable for Turkey, as one
of the founding members of the Council of Europe and
an EU candidate, to confront the European community
and its values.”185
But Turkey may already be feeling isolated as its bid to join the
European Union has not been met with success. 186 With a political
climate of isolation,187 one might wonder, how much Turkey is willing to
pay to keep Europe’s favor? Turkey was sentenced to pay over
€33,000,000 for violations committed and brought before the European
Court of Human Rights in 567 cases between the years of 1990 (when
Turkey first submitted to having individuals cases brought against it in
the European Court of Human Rights) and 2006.188 This sum, though
great, is a mere third of what this one just satisfaction judgment cost
Turkey.
While €90,000,000 is ostensibly the largest sum awarded in any one
just satisfaction case, it appears that the individual relatives of the
missing people will each be receiving around €20,000, which is not that
much more than the €12,000 per individual award that the Court awarded
in the Varnava and Others case.189 “Against the background of the costs
of the continued military presence of 30,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus,
the award is also not excessive.”190
Regardless of the amount of money that the individual GreekCypriots will receive (if they receive anything at all) the purpose of the
judgment was to show Turkey the high costs of illegal occupation and of
ignoring the Court’s decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
This judgment is the Court’s testament to two important facts: 1) just
satisfaction claims are not time-barred and can be applied to inter-State
applications; and 2) the Court will not tolerate aggression or occupation.
The effects of occupation are long-standing and far-reaching and the
Court is doing its best to curb Contracting Parties’ partial compliance
with judgments through large punitive damages.
185
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The actual impact of this new precedent is yet to be seen. If it was
the Court’s intention to pressure Turkey into taking general measures to
prevent human rights violations from occurring in the first place, or from
continuing in the second place, then Turkey may be feeling the pressure.
However, Turkey has yet to make an observable response to the Court’s
actions. In its 2009 annual report, the Committee of Ministers found that
“the issue of slowness and negligence in execution has attracted special
attention.”191 Nations, Turkey included, have been slow to take general
measures to abide by the Court’s judgments.192 While it is rare for a State
to refuse to pay just satisfaction, State “foot-dragging on general
measures” is more common.193 While declaratory judgments and fines
were partially ignored in the past, and while they may continue to be
ignored in the future, the intent of the Court, as shown through the
concurring opinion of various judges, is to punish those errant nations
who simply pay fines but do not change their ways. It may be too soon to
tell if this will be the tipping point to force Turkey’s hand and a deterrent
for other nations bent on occupation. As some members of the Court
noted, “the Court has spoken: it remains for it to be heard.” 194
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